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THE PACIFIC MOTORWAY – A CASE STUDY  
EXAMINING PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT DILEMMAS 
 
ABSTRACT 
During the last two decades the Public Sector in Australia has come under increasing 
pressure to improve performance and demonstrate greater transparency.  In addressing 
these pressures, departments have undertaken innovative adaptations of managerial 
and administrative practices to better suit the demands of the public sector 
environment.  A major area of concern has been in regard to issues of accountability 
brought about by increases in both devolution and contracting out.  Traditional 
adversarial contracts have posed budgetary, quality and completion dilemmas in 
major civil engineering projects in both the private and public sectors.  This paper 
examines the adoption of relational style contracts as well as devolution of managerial 
responsibility in the Department of Main Roads in Queensland.  The paper addresses 
whether contracts that focus on establishing relational interactions rather than 
protecting differing interests have better outcomes for public and parliamentary 
accountability or whether they merely act as further evidence of the different priorities 
of the public and private sectors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the late 20th century, governments throughout the world have been faced with 
an emerging public conviction that governments are too large and inefficient 
(Capling, Crozier and Considine, 1998).  Responses to such pressures have taken 
many forms including a growth in contractualism and increased devolution of 
responsibility (Yeatman, 1994).  This paper examines these specific responses to the 
public sector reform agenda in relation to the Pacific Motorway Project of the 
Department of Main Roads in Queensland (DMR).  It analyses community 
consultation and contract management processes in terms of their implications for 
public management.  The project involves the upgrade of 43 kilometres of the Pacific 
Highway between Brisbane and the Gold Coast to a primarily eight-lane motorway.  
This section of highway is recognized as one of the busiest in Australia and the 
project represents the largest of its type undertaken by DMR (Department of Main 
Roads, 2000).  Given its size and complexity, the project presents an opportunity to 
examine the implementation of innovative managerial and administrative practices 
that are better suited to the demands of the public sector environment. 
 
It is proposed to first give an overview of the project before investigating how the 
dilemmas and challenges encountered were managed.  Given the considerable 
proportion of work on the project being contracted out, the most significant challenge 
identified was to retain acceptable levels of accountability.   Additionally, the 
changing focus of the Department to a customer-orientated culture will be discussed.  
The case study demonstrates how new public management reforms were ingeniously 
adapted to meet the dilemmas and challenges encountered during the project.  In 
doing so it evidences a willingness and ability for a public sector organization to be at 
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the forefront of change and contract management practices.  Finally, the outcomes of 
establishing relational contracts will be examined. Whether this type of contracts has 
better outcomes for public and parliamentary accountability or whether they merely 
act as further evidence of the different priorities of the public and private sectors will 
be considered. 
 
The project – an overview 
An upgrade of the connecting roads between Brisbane and the Gold Coast had been 
mooted for some time.  Prior to the 1995 state election a $680 million motorway was 
proposed, part of which was to pass through the koala habitat of Daisy Hill State 
Forest.  This planned route was scrapped and a $200 million upgrade of the existing 
Pacific Highway was proposed after affected voters reacted at the polls by voting out 
four Labor MP’s as part of a state-wide swing which reduced the Labor Party’s 
majority from 19 seats to 1.  This majority disappeared in the 1996 Mundingburra bi-
election (Morley, 1998).  On coming to power, the Borbidge minority government 
promised an eight-lane expansion to the existing highway at a then estimated cost of 
$630 million (Morley, 1998). 
 
Keen to not share the same fate as their predecessors, the Borbidge Government was 
quick to react, approving the Cabinet submission for the Pacific Motorway on 15 
April 1996.  Attached to this approval was a request to DMR that the road be 
completed within their first term of office.  This was considered by DMR to be an 
unreasonable request, however undertakings were made to have the road completed 
by September 2000 (General Manager DMR personal interview 15 May 2000).  
Immediate pre-construction planning commenced and the draft terms of the Impact 
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Management Plan (IMP) were prepared by June 1996.  Following presentations and 
consultation with community groups, local councils and other special interest groups 
the final IMP was released.  In keeping with a new focus on public relations and 
accountability, the IMP was labelled a “Contract with the Community” (Rust PPK 
Ltd., 1997). 
 
The road was divided into six sections and bids were called for each section.  Due to 
the size of four of the sections there were strong pre-qualification requirements with 
only those firms with the financial capacity to fulfil the terms of the contracts 
permitted to tender.  This limited the qualifying bidders to only six.  The two smaller 
sections were open to a wider selection of bidders.  The process was in keeping with 
both the broad terms of the State Purchasing Policy and the more detailed 
requirements of the Department’s tendering process.  The outcome was that all six 
sections were awarded to the lowest bidder (General Manager DMR personal 
interview 15 May 2000). 
 
It was perceived at the time of awarding the contracts that the tenderers bid low to 
ensure the success of their tenders and increase their chances of aligning themselves 
with a high profile project.   However, all successful bids were bound by traditional 
contracts at cost plus risk, that is, the Department would pay extra for unforeseen 
contingencies (General Manager DMR personal interview 15 May 2000).  Given the 
ability to recover any additional costs through variations, cost-plus traditional 
contracts are often problematic. It is argued traditional contracts lend themselves to an 
adversarial system of negotiation as each party seeks to achieve their objectives and 
maximize their profit margins with little regard for one another’s interests (Thompson 
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and Sanders, 1998). The specific problem with low bids is that such adversarial 
negotiations are heightened to ensure a satisfactory financial return for the contractor. 
 
At the time, such contracts were considered acceptable to DMR as they were 
perceived to reduce disruption to communities along the route.  The potential for 
disruption was two-fold.  First, other types of contracts where all risks rest with the 
contractors are more prone to legal and industrial disputation.  Secondly, potential 
bidders could cause aggravation to communities prior to bidding as they sought to 
establish what risks needed to be factored into their bid price (General Manager DMR 
personal interview 15 May 2000). 
 
As the new road was to now be constructed over the existing road, a major issue for 
the project was to keep traffic flowing during construction.  The magnitude of this 
task cannot be understated given that, as previously noted, this portion of road is one 
of the busiest in Australia.  To coordinate this aspect of the project, a project office 
was established at Pimpama prior to construction.  This is a relatively autonomous 
office dealing directly with many of the stakeholders of the project including local 
councils, interest groups, contractors and communities along the route.  To maintain 
their on-going commitments to these various interested parties DMR appointed an 
external communications group to work closely with the project office (Senior 
Manager DMR personal interview 24 May 2000). 
 
This group’s main responsibilities include staffing the enquiry line, coordinating 
meetings with the various stakeholders, drafting media releases and monitoring and 
coordinating responses to stakeholder concerns through weekly communication and 
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noise meetings with the project office.  The last of these responsibilities includes 
assisting in responding to ministerial complaints.  The communications group has a 
long-term on-going relationship with the Department beyond the scheduled 30 
September project’s end (Senior Manager DMR personal interview 24 May 2000).  
The contracting of an expert communications group in this capacity can be seen as a 
response by DMR to the demands for greater community participation in the design 
and delivery of public services.  The anticipated outcome would be a public 
perception of a more customer-driven and service orientated public sector (Yeatman, 
1994). 
 
Management challenges and dilemmas 
The size and complexity of the project presents many challenges for public 
management.  Most readily identifiable are those issues pertaining to decentralization 
and contractualism, and their impact on public sector accountability.  Other challenges 
relate to the need to balance various stakeholder interests while at the same time 
meeting budget constraints and other parliamentary pressures. 
 
Devolution, Discretion and Accountability 
Whilst high level negotiations between contractors and the Department remains 
centralized in DMR’s head office, a large proportion of the responsibilities attached to 
the IMP and its associated stakeholder responsibilities rests with the Pimpama Project 
Office.  This devolving of responsibilities supports Flynn’s proposal (1993) that 
complexity of both work and environment lend themselves to these types of 
arrangements.  Along with devolution comes an increased degree of discretion that if 
mishandled may have detrimental political effects (O’Faircheallaigh et al, 1999).  The 
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political risks associated with the Pacific Motorway are evident from the political 
backlash created by the Motorway’s predecessor through Daisy Hill State Forest.  
Increasing these risks is a continued lack of public consensus that the Pacific 
Motorway is necessarily the best approach and the view that the road through Daisy 
Hill State Forest still represents the better alternative (Senior Manager DMR personal 
interview 24 May 2000).  The balance between the level of managerial discretion and 
the risks associated with the failure of the project therefore represent an on-going 
dilemma for the project managers and their parliamentary stakeholders.  The dilemma 
for increased managerial discretion is an issue of trust and what such trust implies.  As 
Luhmann (1990) points out, trust exists only in situations where the possible damage 
from a wrong decision may be greater than the benefits sought.  Such is the case for 
the parliamentary stakeholders of this project. 
 
Contracting Out and Accountability 
The parliamentary risk outlined above, as well as other issues of accountability are 
exacerbated by the amount of work contracted out on this project.  The first dilemma 
in relation to contractualism concerns the problems associated with the traditional 
contracts for construction of the six sections of the road.  The Department had given 
an undertaking to parliament to have an operable traffic road by March 2000 and the 
work fully completed by September 2000.  Single projects are usually awarded 
through competitive bidding that give little opportunity to foster cooperative 
relationships between the project owner and contractor (Thompson and Sanders, 
1998). 
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This was the case here.  When work on two sections fell behind schedule, DMR were 
unable, due to the adversarial nature of the traditional contracts, to more closely align 
the goals of the contractors with those of Main Roads (General Manager DMR 
personal interview 15 May 2000).   This situation became a potential source of 
political embarrassment at a time when government had again changed.  The new 
Labor minority government, with its balance of power held by one independent, could 
not afford any community backlash. 
 
The solution for DMR was to replace the two existing contracts with Alliance 
Contracts. The first of these contracts took the form of shared risk plus a built in 
modifier.  Should the project be progressing to the department’s satisfaction, a bonus 
could be achieved.  Despite this, delays and ambit claims continued to plague one of 
the sections.  An independent expert was hired to determine a new target price and a 
more formal Alliance Contract was drafted.  This contract included conditions that, 
should the work come in under target price, the difference be evenly split between 
DMR and the contractor.  Likewise, should the work come in over target, the costs are 
to be shared 50/50 representing a potential for loss to the contractor (General Manager 
DMR personal interview 15 May 2000). 
 
To overcome issues of probity, all other contractors on the project were notified of the 
change in conditions to these two contracts.  Despite delays and ambit claims 
impacting on these other four sections, new contracts were not drafted however a 
partnering approach was adopted.  This type of approach seeks to alter the traditional 
adversarial relationship to one based on trust and the pursuit of common goals 
(Thompson and Sanders, 1998, Lazar, 2000).   In the case of DMR and the remaining 
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traditional contracts, this approach includes a dispute resolution process.  A 
professional mediator was appointed to bring the contract amounts into an acceptable 
range (General Manager DMR personal interview 15 May 2000).  The problems in 
aligning expectations highlight the challenges for DMR in maintaining an acceptable 
level of accountability while contending with issues outside their direct control. 
 
The second contractual arrangement with the potential for problems of accountability 
concerns the appointment of an independent company to oversee communications for 
the project.  This decision was made when it was recognized that the department 
could not, without affecting service delivery elsewhere, allocate sufficient resources 
to meet the community obligations promised in the IMP (Senior Manager DMR 
personal interview 24 May 2000).  This relationship has, to date, been a successful 
one evidenced by the monitoring of various key indicators by DMR.  Primary 
amongst these has been a significant decrease in the number of ministerial complaints 
(Department of Main Roads, undated). The Industry Commission (1996) has argued 
that contracting out does not reduce accountability and may improve it.  The success 
of this contractual arrangement however, does not negate concerns regarding 
accountability, especially when considering the scope of the contractor’s 
responsibilities in this project.   
 
Despite the close working relationship between the communications group and DMR, 
the hierarchical chain is broken.  Delegation of responsibility is replaced by specific 
contractual terms.  In a relationship of principal and agent, the principal is not legally 
responsible for the contractor’s actions (Mulgan, 1997).  This contractual relationship, 
whilst far more relational in nature than the construction contracts, still exemplifies 
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the ongoing dilemma between relinquishing hierarchical control and retaining 
accountability. An important moderator of this contract is the relational environment 
created.  This is manifested in DMR and contractor staff working closely together on 
a continuous basis within the Pimpama office.  Such an arrangement provides greater 
opportunity to monitor the performance of this contractor.  It, therefore, supports 
Mulgan’s (1997) contention that the amount of accountability lost through contracting 
out is mitigated by the ease by which the contractors’ performance can be monitored. 
 
A client focus – but which client? 
Over the last two decades, there has been increased community pressure for the public 
sector to move from its bureaucratic focus on administering regulations to become 
more client focused (Hughes, 1998, Capling et al, 1998).  This trend is indicated in the 
entitling of the IMP as DMR’s “Contract with the Community”.   The final draft was 
the product of extensive community consultation.  The document focuses on the 
impact of the proposed motorway on the environment, local communities and the 
needs of commuters.  In doing so, it already acknowledges three interest groups with 
agendas at variance with one another.  Such competing interests need to be balanced 
to deliver an acceptable outcome for all.  The project involved the resumption of land 
and the bypassing of businesses and tourist areas previously located at strategic 
positions along the existing highway.   Combined with this were the concerns of 
residents along the route in regard to noise, traffic, street access and property 
devaluations as well as others disappointed that the original route had not proceeded 
(Senior Manager DMR personal interview 24 May 2000). 
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These interests continue to be addressed on a continuous basis through community 
meetings, newsletters and individual responses.  New issues earmarked for discussion 
by the communications group are raised through weekly meetings with DMR and 
solutions proposed.  The combination of the communications expertise of the 
contractor and technical expertise of DMR has been seen to be beneficial in the 
handling of these various and competing interests (Department of Main Roads, 
undated).  It could be argued however that, despite the amount of community 
consultation, few significant changes have been made in response.  DMR continues to 
be limited by the dilemma of combining devolved managerial responsibility with the 
necessity of delivering bureaucratically impartial outcomes to all individuals (Hughes, 
1998). 
 
Perhaps the most demanding of clients were two successive state governments 
holding power by small majorities.  Initially, the Borbidge Government’s demand that 
the motorway be completed within its first term of office presented DMR with what it 
saw as an unrealistic expectation, but which the government viewed as politically 
necessary to retain office (General Manager DMR personal interview 15 May 2000).  
The positive aspect of this was that DMR also considered the implied parliamentary 
support as one of the strengths of the project (Department of Main Roads, undated).  
When the Beattie Labor government gained power in 1998, this support initially 
wavered.  As the Motorway was not a Labor Party initiative, it came under close 
scrutiny on the change of government but has since gained acceptance (General 
Manager DMR personal interview 15 May 2000). 
 
Deficit Reduction and the Need for Investment 
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The Pacific Motorway falls outside the normal DMR budgeting process in that it was 
approved through cabinet submission (General Manager DMR personal interview 15 
May 2000).  The initial plan under the Goss Labor government was to construct a 
$680 million link between Brisbane and the Gold Coast.  When Goss’ electoral 
margin decreased from 19 to 1, the link was scrapped and the new proposal was for a 
comparatively inexpensive minor upgrade to the Pacific Highway at an estimated cost 
of $200 million (Morley, 1998).  This proposal was short-lived as the Mundingburra 
by-election handed government to the Coalition.  The new government proposed to 
proceed with a major upgrade to the Pacific Highway as quickly as possible (Morley, 
1998).  
 
Having criticized the previous administration for wasting $77 million of taxpayer’s 
money and denigrating their ability to handle major infrastructure projects the new 
Borbidge government was anxious not to make similar mistakes (Morley, 1998).   
DMR were requested to give a cost estimate as quickly as possible resulting in a 
proposed amount of $630 million.  After further work on the IMP and, by the 
Borbidge Government’s second year in office, this jumped to $750 million (Morley, 
1998, Queensland Treasury, 1998) arguably bringing pressure on DMR to accept the 
lowest bids.  This formed a major variation to Queensland Treasury’s capital outlays 
program (Queensland Treasury, 1998) and Treasury wanted to know where the money 
was coming from (General Manager DMR personal interview 15 May 2000). 
 
On two occasions the Director General of Main Roads sought independent auditors to 
assess monthly reports on the project’s progress.  On both occasions, representatives 
from Treasury, Premiers Department and State Development were invited to peruse 
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and discuss the reports.  This process can be seen to fulfil a two-fold purpose.  First, it 
aided transparency through the appointment of independent auditors and, second, the 
decisions of departmental managers exercising increased managerial discretion could 
be brought to account.  These audits therefore provided a mechanism through which 
public and political accountability risks associated with devolution and contracting 
out could be reduced. 
 
THE OUTCOMES AND LESSONS OF THE PACIFIC MOTORWAY 
 
It has been demonstrated, through the election backlash caused by its predecessor the 
proposed motorway through the Daisy Hill Forest, that the Pacific Motorway has been 
a cause of great political risk and considerable public interest. Dilemmas in balancing 
stakeholder interests and dealing with issues of accountability have been shown to be 
associated with both the contractual arrangements and the devolution of management 
responsibility with its associated increase in managerial discretion.  The decision to 
devolve managerial responsibility on the Pacific Motorway project appears to have 
been based upon the complexity of the project.  This suggests that, in this case, issues 
of process took priority over dilemmas of trust and accountability.  The performance 
of random audits mitigated this to a degree through assurances that aided in the 
reduction of parliamentary concerns regarding the project’s potential to create 
economic and political embarrassment. 
 
The aligning of values between a public sector agency and its private sector 
contractors emphasizes the role relational arrangements can play in achieving a 
balance between political pressures and commercial viability. Political considerations 
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were shown to have caused the department on two occasions to adopt positions at 
odds with, what they considered, technically and commercially prudent.  The timing 
constraints of both the costing of the project and its completion date brought 
performance pressure on the department which, to satisfy their parliamentary 
stakeholders, was transmitted to the contractors. This resulted in the first instance in 
an incorrect estimation of costs.  Through the adoption of more relational 
arrangements the timing constraint is set to be achieved.  Final costings are not yet 
available, but appear, at this time, to be falling within an acceptable budgetary range.  
Private sector organizations would not generally be culturally aligned to delivering 
such near obligatory responses demanded of parliamentary accountability (Estes, 
1996).  There is evidence in this case study to support the proposition that relational 
contracts do deliver better outcomes in this regard. 
 
Traditional adversarial contracts have posed significant problems in both the public 
and private sectors as they foster an environment where the pursuit of individual gain 
often outweighs the purpose for which they are drafted (Thompson and Sanders, 
1998).  This case study evidences the benefits of relational style contracts through two 
means.  Firstly, the original construction contracts were drawn up in traditional 
adversarial terms.  During the period for which this arrangement ensued, DMR faced 
outcomes typical of such contracts in that much time was devoted to ambit claims 
requiring third party legal intervention.  Through the introduction of more relational 
arrangements, there was an improvement in the alignment of the goals and values of 
the contractors with those of DMR resulting in decreased reliance on such 
intervention. Secondly, adversarial negotiations were not reflected in the contractual 
arrangements between the communications group and DMR. From the outset, the 
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association between DMR and the Communications company resembled more a 
‘relational’ arrangement reliant on a high level of cooperation and trust (Lazar, 2000).  
The extent to which the two parties worked together has resulted in a merging of 
values and goals that have averted the more adversarial outcomes of the traditional 
contract.  Both situations offer important lessons when considering relational contract 
arrangements. 
 
The Industry Commission has argued that contracting out can enhance accountability 
however this case study indicates that the Commission’s recommendations to achieve 
this are not easy to accomplish in solely contractual terms. Attaining more acceptable 
levels of accountability when contracting out would, however, appear to benefit from 
an emphasis on relationships. Typical of traditional contracts, there were difficulties 
in this project in fully specifying the services to be delivered and in precisely 
allocating responsibility in legally contractual terms.   Relational agreements rely on 
the ability of the parties to negotiate terms outside those specifically itemized in a 
legal contract. The different outcomes from each of the contractual arrangements in 
this project indicate that careful consideration needs to be given to the nature of the 
contractual arrangements that should be entered into.  When contemplating relational 
agreements, such considerations should include the types of services being contracted, 
the degree of control over the contracted work and, perhaps most importantly, the 
culture of the contractor company and the degree to which it can be made to 
proximate that of the public sector agency.  This is demonstrated by DMR being 
unable, in two instances, to align the goals of contractors without drafting specific 
contractual terms.  All remaining contracts benefited from non-contractual relational 
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arrangements to deliver outcomes more in line with time and budgetary constraints 
with reduced reliance on legal intervention. 
 
This case study therefore demonstrates that no matter how clearly the terms of a 
traditional contract can be documented, relational arrangements can improve the 
ability to balance stakeholder interests.  At the outset DMR considered it more 
important to consider the interests of local residents leading up to the commencement 
of construction and therefore assumed a standard “all risks” position in drafting the 
construction contracts.  This, in hindsight, may not have been the best choice as it 
provided both the adversarial environment and contractual conditions for contractors 
to manoeuvre around specific terms.  Had closer relationships been established earlier, 
and had the culture of the contracting companies been taken into account when 
awarding contracts, many of the earlier legal disputes may not have occurred.  By 
later establishing more relational arrangements, DMR appears to be drawing the 
project to a conclusion which achieves a satisfactory compromise with their 
parliamentary, contractual and public stakeholders.  Much of the success with the 
public stakeholders can be attributed to the relationship between the Communications 
company and DMR evidencing that, for the provision of more interpersonal types of 
services, relational arrangements can deliver satisfactory outcomes. 
 
Whilst the benefits of better accountability and improved stakeholder outcomes 
through relational arrangements are evident in this case, the differing results from the 
contractual arrangements also indicate they are not ideal in all circumstances and that 
some contracts benefit from more closely defined terms.  Additionally, there are other 
issues of accountability that need to be considered with relational arrangements and 
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their suitability for the public sector.   As they rely heavily on trust, they require time 
and long associations to deliver the best outcomes.  This case indicates they are better 
suited to longer projects, multiple projects or long-term service provision.  This 
however, may adversely affect the perceived neutrality of the competitive tendering 
process in that it may effectively shut out potential bidders leading to allegations of 
cronyism, collusion and corruption.  Addressing this issue of accountability would 
benefit from further investigation. 
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